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Conflicts of interest: an invisible force shaping health 
systems and policies
Despite years of discussion and frustration about 
why public health evidence does not influence policy 
decisions as much as it should, there has been little 
attention to a fundamental force in decision making: 
conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest arise when the 
potential for individual or group gain compromises the 
professional judgment of policy makers or health-care 
providers. Conflicts of interest underpin rent-seeking 
and informal practice across the world, but their nuanced 
nature makes them challenging to identify, research, 
and address. Conflicts of interest are often very subtle; 
no action needs to be taken for them to exist. In many 
countries, the heterogeneous nature of mixed health 
systems and complex care pathways are compounded 
by weak governance mechanisms,1 which increase the 
potential for conflicts of interest to occur and make 
them difficult to address with existing regulatory and 
policy frameworks, including self-disclosure man-
dates or malpractice procedures. To begin to illuminate 
these issues and to develop a research agenda, we have 
characterised three different types of conflicts of interest 
that are particularly pervasive in mixed or pluralistic 
health systems (table). We emphasise how these 
conflicts impede the development of health policies to 
better structure and govern state and non-state health-
care providers.
The first type of conflict of interest occurs when policy 
makers or regulators have multiple or dual roles. In 
this scenario, their (primary) professional decisions are 
open to influence from other relationships that create 
financial, social, or familial ties with the institutions or 
industries that they are responsible for regulating. For 
example, owners of pharmaceutical companies or their 
family members often hold decision-making power 
in drug regulatory agencies responsible for making 
and implementing policies on drug quality and ethical 
marketing practices.2 Thus, key decision makers are 
incentivised to influence the design of new policies or 
the resources allocated to implement policies, such 
that sales of medicines are not affected. Ultimately, this 
process protects their financial interests or those of their 
friends and families.
The second type of conflict of interest occurs because of 
hidden financial relationships between formal (licenced) 
and informal (unlicenced) health-care providers.3,4 Owing 
to financial flows from informal to formal providers, the 
latter might publicly support stronger regulation of the 
informal health-care sector while covertly using their 
power to obstruct policies that curtail informal practice.5 
For example, in many countries, doctors and pharmacists 
illegally rent their professional licences to set up drug 
shops and clinics where lower paid attendants, typically 
without the desired or prescribed qualifications, can 
provide services.2,6 Policies to address inappropriate 
delivery of health care by unqualified providers in such 
drug shops and clinics would, therefore, reduce a source 
of income for doctors and pharmacists, resulting in their 
often tacit opposition.
The third type of conflict of interest occurs when 
policy makers are influenced into taking a course of 
Competing interest Example of effect on policies
Policy makers or regulators are expected to 
formulate and implement policies that ensure 
appropriate care delivery by private health-care 
providers
A secondary relationship that results in financial, 
social, or familial connection with the institutions 
they are responsible for regulating, such that the 
policy actor or regulator may prefer weaker controls. 
Weakening of policies: policy formulation influenced 
such that weaker rules are introduced. Alternatively, 
policy implementing bodies (eg, drug inspection 
agencies) are under-resourced to enforce rules.
Formal health-care providers have a 
responsibility to provide and support the 
provision of health care in accordance with local 
regulations and professional ethics standards
Financial flows from informal (illegal) providers or 
practice create additional sources of income for 
formal providers.
Covert opposition to change: formal providers publicly 
support stronger regulation of informal practice, but 
covertly influence the policy-making process to enable 
it to continue and thrive.
Policy decisions should reflect public health 
evidence and best practice
Policy makers do not want to introduce or enforce 
rules to curtail the private sector as they know these 
will be unpopular with large segments of the 
population and could potentially expose gaps in 
roles of the public sector.
Regulatory impasse: stronger regulations to curtail 
inappropriate private sector activities, which are 
sound from a public health perspective, are avoided as 
they might cost policy makers popularity and personal 
career growth.
Table: Summary of the different types of conflict of interest pervasive in mixed or pluralistic health systems with weak governance mechanisms 
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action that is more likely to win political support, rather 
than following public health evidence. Policy makers are 
cognisant that introducing or enforcing rules to regulate 
private health-care provision could be unpopular 
because of dependencies on the sector’s contributions.7 
Ultimately, such policies could be detrimental to 
their careers. For example, the reliance on unlicenced 
medicine sellers to provide access to essential medicines 
for populations in under-resourced areas is hugely 
challenging for policy makers in numerous countries.2,8 
Policies to reduce service provision by private providers, 
including those that are untrained and providing 
substandard care, are often avoided due to concerns 
that they will expose gaps in health care that the public 
sector should be providing.5
We have discussed the role of conflicts of interest 
in mixed health systems with weak governance 
mechanisms, but the influence of conflicts of interest 
on health policies is widespread. The ongoing pandemic 
showcases the extent to which conflicts of interest have 
surfaced in COVID-19-related policy decisions in every 
country, including some high-income countries often 
associated with low corruption. Concerns have also 
been raised about the influence of conflicts of interest 
on funding decisions and global health partnerships.8 In 
our research, we have found that analysis of, and action 
on, conflicts of interest will be essential for properly 
managing the use of antibiotics to stem antimicrobial 
resistance and for achieving universal health coverage 
by reducing out-of-pocket payments.2,3,5
Although conflicts of interest remain a global issue 
that is neglected, underestimated, and overlooked 
by health policy makers and researchers, conflicts of 
interest connect with many wider issues within health 
policy and systems research. At present, there is a 
growing body of evidence and concern surrounding 
corruption in health systems.9,10 This attention to 
corruption is likely to result in interest in examining 
and making sense of conflicts of interest in the coming 
years. We hope that our characterisation of conflicts of 
interest is a useful tool in beginning this necessary work.
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